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Unilaterally removing implicit subsidies for maritime fuels: a mechanism to unilaterally tax maritime emissions while satisfying extraterritoriality, tax competition and political constraints Heine, D.; Gäde, S. (2018). Unilaterally removing implicit subsidies for maritime fuels: a mechanism to unilaterally tax maritime emissions while satisfying extraterritoriality, tax competition and political constraints. International Economics and Economic Policy 15(2): 523-545. https://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10368-017-0410-6 In: International Economics and Economic Policy. Springer Nature: Switzerland. ISSN 1612-4804; e-ISSN 1612-4812

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Beschikbaar in	Auteurs
VLIZ: Open access 361539 [ download pdf ]

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Author keywords

Carbon taxation; Maritime emissions; Regional action; International agreements; Tax competition; H23; H87; K33; K34; Q54; Q58

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Auteurs		Top
Heine, D. Gäde, S.

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Abstract

Many academics and policymakers agree that implicit tax subsidies for maritime fuels — which are currently granted around the world — are inefficient, but that their abolishment requires a unanimous international agreement. Such an agreement is deemed indispensable because any unilateral action would be impossible due to massive tax competition in this industry, competitiveness effects and the legal limits on regulating an industry operating mostly in international waters, thus outside of any state’s jurisdiction. However, an international agreement to solve these problems has proven impossible to reach, thus resulting in the conservation of the status quo. To break this deadlock, we propose a mechanism whereby a small coalition of countries, to start with, can abolish these implicit tax subsidies even in the absence of an international agreement. This incentive-compatible scheme solves the above-mentioned issues. The mechanism is furthermore designed to avoid locking in a sub-global scheme. Instead, it has the potential to contribute to unlocking the gridlock in negotiations over a global agreement on this matter.

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